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THE GOVERNMENT'S LIABILITY FOR THE USE
OF PATENTED INVENTIONS.
The abstract right of the holder of letters patent from
the United States, whether as original inventor or as
assigiee', to receive compensation for the use of the pat-
enited invention by the government itself, is thoroughly
established. "The government cannot, after the patent
is issued, make use of the improvement any more than a
private individual, without license of the inventor or
making compensation to him.' 'x "Agents of the public
have no more right to take such property than other indi-
viduals under that provision ['the exclusive right to
make, use, and vend,' R. S., Section 48841, as it contains
no exception warranting any such invasion of the private
rights of individuals. "2 "That the government of the
United States, when it grants letters patent for a new
invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon the pat-
entee exclusive property in the patented invention which
cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself,
.without just compensation, any more than it can appro-
priate or use without compensation land which has been
patented to a private purchaser, we have no doubt. The
constitution gives to Congress power 'to promote the
pr6gress of science and useful arts by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries,' which could not be
effected if the government had a reserved right to publish
such writings or to use such inventions without the con-
sent of the owner. Many inventions relate to subjects
which can only be properly used by the government, such
as explosive shells, rams, and submarine batteries to be
attached to armed vessels. If it could use such inven-
tions without compensation, the inventors could get no
return at all for their discoveries and experiments.. It
has been the general practice, when inventions have been
1 United States v. Burns, 12 Wall. 246 (x87).
'Cammeyer v. Netlon, 94 U. S. 22 S , 235 (1876).
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made which are desirable for government use, either for
the government to purchase them from the inventors, and
use them as secrets of the proper department; or, if a
patent is granted, to pay the patentee a fair compensation
for their use. The United States has no such prerogative
as that which is claimed by the sovereigns of England, by
which it can reserve to itself, either expressly or by impli-
cation, a superior-dominion and use in that which it grants
by letters patent to those who entitle themselves to such
grants. The government of the United States, as well as
the citizen, is subject to the constitution, and when it
grants a patent the grantee is entitled to it as a matter of
right, and does not receive it, as was originally supposed
to be the case in England, as a matter of grace and favor."s
Such are a few of the expressions of the views of the
Supreme Court on this subject, but clear and satisfactory
as the law is in regard to the existence of a right, it is far
from being equally so in regard to the practical enforce-
ment of that right. The Court of Claims; though estab-
lished in 1855, did not exist as a court in the proper sense
of the term, with power to render a final judgment, until
x863, or, strictly speaking, until x866, and it has always
been a court of limited jurisdiction. As reorganized in
z863, its jurisdiction extended, inter alia, to "all claims
founded upon any lawof Congress, or upon any regulation
of an executive department, or upon any contract, ex-
pressed or implied, with the government of the United
States, and all claims which may be referred to it by
either House of Congress." This provision granted no
jurisdiction over wrongs done to individuals by the
officers of the government acting in the belief that it was
for its interest. Such matters were held to be reserved
by Congress for its own determination.4 Hence there
3 Jones v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356 (x88x).
' Gibbonsv. United States, 8 Wall. 269 (868), 275; AMorgan v. United
States, 14 Wall. 531 (1871). In the first of these cases Mr. Justice
Miller said: "Congress has wisely reserved the matter for its own
determination." The wisdom will not be conceded by those who
believe that the government should never be put in the position of
granting compensation as a matter of special personal favor; that if
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could be no jurisdiction over infringements of patents,
but the right of suit was clear enough in cases of express
contract, as where payment of the stipulated royalty had
been stopped under an erroneous idea that the contract
was in conflict with a provision of the army regulations.'
The only instances of jurisdiction in cases of plain in-
fringement, where no contract could- be implied, have
arisen under a special act or resolution of Congress.'
Where the officers of the government have wished to
make an express contract, but have been unable to come
to terms with the patentee and have gone on to use the
patented device, recovery may be had, under an implied
contract, the court fixing such rate of royalty as the evi-
dence may show to be reasonable.7 Such a case would
seem clearly to involve the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, where the law implies a promise of compensation,
upon which an action.would lie, within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Claims, just as in cases of the taking of
real estate;' and where contractual relations between
the parties have once been established by a judgment in
such a case, the use of a device which the government
avers to be different from that of the claimant, and for
which another patent has been granted, will still be
treated as a use under the contract, if it be held that the
devices are really equivalent.'.
A difficulty often arises, however, in cases where the
officers of the government use a patented device either
in ignorance of the fact that the patent has been granted,
or else in the belief that they are not using what is pat-
ented, or that they have a right to use it without regard
to the fact of its being patented. As between individuals
or corporations, relief in such cases could be sought on
the claim of a citizen deserves to be paid at all, it deserves to be paid
as a matter of right, and that the existence of such right is purely a
judicial question, to be determined by a court.
I United Stales v. Burns, x2 Wall. 246 (x8z1).
* E. g., Hubbell v. United States, 5 Ct. Cls. R. 1 (1869).
1 Pasqueau v. United States. 26 Ct. Cls. R. 5o9 (1891).
a Holliste v. Benedict AfIg. Co., x3 U. S. S9 (1884).
* Pasqueau v United States, Ct. of Clms. (x899"), not reported.
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the ground of infringement merely, but infringement is
a tort, and the United States, it is held, cannot be guilty
of a tort and hence cannot be liable on any such
ground. Unfortunately, many patentees have failed
to realize that their legal right of recovery for the
use of their patented devices was much more restricted
as against the United States than as against private citi-
zens, and hence have not sought to protect themselves
by definite contracts 10 and, on the other hand, govern-
ment officers seem to have often assumed that because
the legal remedy against the government was somewhat
limited, therefore the possible consequence of the use of
a patented invention was no concern of theirs and could
be left to take care of itself.
In order to secure relief in such cases, patentees have
invoked the doctrine of implied contracts, and also -the
constitutional provision that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation. In
one of the first suits" brought in the Court of Claims,
after its reorganization in x863, where the warden of a
United States penitentiary had bought certain machines,
made without authority from the assignee of the patent,
the claimant urged both of these points, but the petition
was dismissed on demurrer. The court held that the
warden, being merely a subordinate officer, had no power
to take property for the government's use or to bind it
by contracts without either express authority of law or
1* The case of Kirk v. United States, x63 U. S. 49 (xS95), is an ex-
treme illustration of the idea, prevalent among some patentees, that
any claim ought to be valid. "If a patentee," said the court, 'could
under any circumstances sue to recover for the use of a patented article.
made before letters were granted, . . it certainly could not
apply to a case where the patentee was not the inventor of thing
patented; where the device had been in public use more than two
years before the patent was applied for; and 'where the government,
so far from agreeing to pay a royalty for it, had protested against any
patent being issued for it. We know of no principle upon which a
contract can be evoked from a distinct refusal of one party to recog-
nize the rights of the other, and a formal protest against any such
rights being granted to him. '
n Pitcher v. United States, i C. CIs. R. 7 (1864).
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the direction of some superior officer who had such au-
thority, so that there had not been any taking of private
property for public use within the meaning of the consti-
tution, and further that the incapacity of the government
to commit or authorize a tort was no reason for implying
a contract from the acts of one who could not contract
expressly. The case was held to be one of infringement
-pure and simple, where the regular statutory remedy
against the individual infringer was available, though
whether such remedy' would be appropriate and ample
in this particular case, the court did not feel called upon
to decide.
Practically this case decided two points: first, that a
recovery against the United States, in a suit on a patent,
must be based on some other ground than that of infringe-
ment (a point substantially conceded in the petition), and
second, that no liability can be imposed upon the United
States by implication from the act of an agent who would
have had no authority to bind the government by express
agreement in regard to the particular matter.*
The decision on this latter point seems to have been
overlooked by Judge Davis, in the opinion in Talbert v,
United States,"2 when he said: "Admiral Smith had not
the power to commit the government to a contract for
royalty, but an implied contract arose, as we have seen,
from the user, and having taken advantage of the act of
their agent, Admiral Smith, the chief of the Bureau of
Yards and Docks, in applying the device, they must be
held to the condition, agreed upon by him and Talbert,
that the patentee should be compensated." In that par-
ticular case the suit was under a special jurisdictional act,
authorizing compensation for the use of the invention, so
that it was immaterial whether a contract could have been
implied or not, and hence the statement just quoted must
be regarded as obiter. Certainly it cannot be reconciled
with the decision in Pitcher v. United States, which is itself
manifestly founded on reason.
The argument that the government's use of a patented
is 2S C. CIs. R. 142 (1890).
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device, whether by way of contract or not, should always
be the subject of compensation as a taking of private
property for public use, came up again after the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Claims had been somewhat amplified
in x887, so as to cover-
All claims founded upon the constitution of the United
States or any law of Congress, except for pensions, or upon
any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
contract, express or implied, with the government of the
United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated,
in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims
the party would be entitled to redress against the United
States either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the
United States were suable.""
.Within a month after the act was passed, suit was
brought on a patent, the petition setting up an infringe-
ment, and stating that "the basis of this suit is upon
their [the claimants'] patent rights, which are founded
upon the patent laws of the United States." These
words were evidently used with the idea of setting up a
claim founded upon a "law of Congress." In delivering
the opinion of the Supreme Court,1' Mr. Justice Brewer
cited Gibbons v. United States and Morgan v. United States
(supra), to the effect that the act of 1863 had given the
Court of Claims no jurisdiction over torts, and said:
"It is said that the constitution forbids the taking of
private property for public uses without just compensa-
tion; that, therefore, every appropriation of private
property by any official to the uses of the government,
no matter however wrongfully made, creates a claim
founded upon the constitution of the United States and
within the letter of the grant in the act of 1887 of the
jurisdiction to the Court of Claims. If that argument
be good, it is equally good applied to every other provi-
sion of the constitution as well as to every law of Congress.
This prohibition of the taking of private property for
public use without compensation is no more sacred than
" Act of Mar. 3, 1887, generally known as the Tucker Act, 24 Stats.
5o5, Supp. R. S., Vol. z, 559-
14 Schiinger v. United States, x$5 U. S. z63, z68 (z894).
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that other constitutional provision that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law. Can it be that Congress intended that every
wrongful arrest and detention of an individual, or seizure
of his property by an officer of the government, should
expose it to an action for damages in the Court of Claims?
If any such breadth of jurisdiction was contemplated,
language which had already been given a restrictive mean-
ing would have been carefully avoided.
"It is true also that to jurisdiction over claims f- rded
'upon any-cpntract,. expressed or implied, with the gov-
ernment of the United States,' is added jurisdiction over
claims 'for damages-,liquidated or unliquidated,' but this
grant is limited by the provision 'in cases not sounding
in tort.' This limitation, even if qualifying only the
clause immediately preceding, and not extending to the
entire grant of jurisdiction found in the section, is a clear
endorsement of the frequent ruling of this court that
cases sounding in tort are not cognizable in the Court of
Claims.
"That this action is one sounding in tort is clear. It'
is in form one to recover damages. The petition charges
a .wrongful appropriation by the government, against
the protest of the claimants, and prays to recover the
damages done by such wrong. The successive allega-
tions place the parties in continued antagonism to each
other, and there is no statement tending to show a coming
together of minds in respect to anything. It is plainly
and solely an action for an infringement, and in this con-
nection reference may be made to the statutory provision
(Rev. Stats., Section 4919) of an action on the case, as the
legal remedy for the recovery of damages for the infringe-
ment of a patent. If it be said that a party may some-
times waive a tort and sue in assumpsit, as on an implied
promise, it is technically a sufficient reply to say that
these claimants have not done so. They have not
counted on any promise, either express or implied.
"But we do not care to rest our decision upon the mere
form of action. The transaction as stated in the petition,
and as disclosed by the findings of the court, was a tort
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pure and simple. The case was, Within the language of
the statute, one 'sounding in tort.' It is in this respect
essentially different- from United States v. Palmer, 128
U. S. 262, 269 (x888). That was an action to recover for
the authorized use of a patent by the government.
"Here the claimants never authorized the use of the
patent right by the government; never consented to, but
always protested against it, threatening to interfere by
injunction or other proceedings to restrain such use.
There was no act of Congress in terms directing, or even
by implication suggesting, the use of the patent. No
officer of the government directed its use, and the con-
tract which was executed by Cook did not name or de-
scribe it. There was no recognition by the government
or any of its officers of the fact that in the construction
of the pavement there was any use of the patent, or
that any appropriation was being made of claimant's
property. The government proceeded as though it were
acting only in the management of its own .property and
the exercise of its own rights, and -ithout any trespass
upon the rights of the claimants. There was no point in
the whole transaction from its commencement to its close
where the minds of the parties met or where there was
anything in the semblance of an agreement. So not only
does the petition count upon a tort, but also the findings
show a tort. That is the essential fact underlying the
transaction and upon which rests every pretence of a
right to recover. There was no suggestion of a waiver
of the tort or a pretence of any implied contract until
after the decision of the Court of Claims that it had no
jurisdiction over an action to recover for the tort."
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Shiras dissented
from this conclusion on two grounds: first, "that when
the government, by its agent, knowingly uses or permits
to be used for its benefit a patented invention, it is liable
to suit in the Court of Claims for the value of such use,
and that its liability arises out of [a] contract based upon
the constitutional requirement that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation;"
and second, that "independent of mere contract, . .
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the claim to have just compensation for such an appro-
priation of private property to public use is founded upon
the constitution of the United States," and therefore
within the terms of the act of 1887.
In United States v. Berdan Firearms Co., 5 decided but
a few months after the Schillinger case, the government
had again denied the existence of a contract, but .t was
held that it must be implied, and even from what the
findings failed to show as well as from what they showed.
Mr. Justice Brewer, who had himself delivered the opinion
in the Schillinger case, said:
"In the case at bar, according to th6 nineteenth finding,
'Berdan, as an officer of plaintiffs herein, assignees of his
inventions during the period covered by this adtion, was
in constant communication with the ordnance officers,
requesting the use of his devices by the government; they
knew him as an inventor, and knew his inventions as soon
as they were patented;' and, by the twenty-third, 'the
plaintiffs have desired the government should use their
patented devices, and have also desired and requested
compensation for such use.' So far, then, as the peti-
tioner is concerned, the use of this invention was with its
consent, in accordance with its wish, and with the thought
of compensation therefor.
"While the findings are not so specific and emphatic as
to the assent of the government to the terms of any con-
tract, yet we think they are sufficient. There -was cer-
tainly no denial of the patentee's rights to the invention;
no assertion on the part of the government that the patent
was wrongfully issued; no claim of a right to use the in-
vention regardless of the patent; no disregard of all claims
of the patentee, and no use, in spite of protest or remon-
strance. Negatively, at least the findings are clear. The
government used the invention with the consent and ex-
-press permission of the owner, and it did not, while so
using it, repudiate the title of such owner.
"The nineteenth finding, besides showing knowledge
on the .part of the officers of the government of Berdan's
Is z56 U. S. S52 (1894)
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invention, states, in a general way, that 'the attitude of
the War Department towards inventors in ordnance has
been one of neutrality; it has neither denied nor admitted
the legal rights, if any there were, of inventors; in an
endeavor to perfect the government arm that department
has taken advantage of all kriowledge within its reach
and of all inventions; it does not deny the claims of in-
ventors, but has proceeded upon the policy that executive
officers should not decide upon such claims against the
government or upon conflicting claims, but that the claim
should be presented without prejudice before some other
tribunal than an executive department.
"The import of these findings is: That the officers of
the government, charged specially with the duty of super-
intending the manufacture of muskets, regarded Berdan
as the inventor of this extractor-ejector; that the differ-
nce between the spiral and flat spring was an immaterial
lifference; that, therefore, they were using in the Spring-
ield musket Berdan's invention; that they used it with
iis permission as well as that of his assignee, the peti-
;ioner, and that they used it with the understanding that
-he government would pay for such use as for other pri-
rate property which it might take, and this, although
hey did not believe themselves to have the authority to
.gree upon the price."
The case of Russell v. United States1 resembled the
3erdan case in some respects, but was held to involve an
afringement and not a contract. A contract existed
letween the government and another patentee, the Krag-
Srgensen Company, wherein the patentee guaranteed the
:overnment against all claims on account of patents, as
egards both the patented and the unpatented portions
,f the gun, but shortly before that contract had been made
he appellant had notified the chief of ordnance that cer-
ain claims in his own patent were infringed in the con-
tructon of the gun, and requested that "in considering
he allowance to inventors . . our claims for these
to z82 U. S. S'6 (t9oz).
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vital points of construction be regarded." The reply was
as follows:
"The business arrangements with the Krag-J6rgensen
Company for the manufacture of this arm have not yet
been completed.
"On the one hand; that company may agree to-indem-
nify the United States on account of any patent rights
granted by the United States which may affect the manu-
facture of the guns, in which case your recourse would be
to-communicate directly with the company.
"On the other hand, should the government .proceed
to manufacture the arms without such arrangement, your
course will be to bring a suit against the government in
the Court of Claims after manufacture has progressed."
Other communications followed between the appellant
and the ordnance office, in which the words "infringe"
and "infringement" were repeatedly used, and in more
than one of which the appellant was informed that the
case "cannot be determined by the Ordnance Depart-
ment."
The position taken by the chief of ordnance in this case
was practically the same as in the Berdan case, viz., that
he could not undertake to decide whether any part of the
claimant's patented device had been used or not, and that
if the claimant wished compensation he should sue in the
Court of Claims. It does not appear that the chief of
ordnance had asserted that the government had any right,
as against Russell, to use that portion of the Krag gun
mechanism which Russell said was covered by his patent,
and the difference between the two cases was mainly in
the way the parties had .expressed themselves in their
dealings with each other. In.the Berdan case apparently
no expressions had been used inconsistent with the idea
of a contract, although of course the word "contract"
had never itself been used, while in the Russell case the
words "infringe" and "infringement" had been used
repeatedly on both sides. Substantially, then, the Rus-
sell case seems to decide merely that if a patentee delib-
erately treats the case as one of infringement, he cannot
be allowed afterwards to say that he did not mean
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infringement, but meant implied contract. It is to be
observed that Shiras, White, and Peckham, JJ., dissented,
and that Harlan, J., did not participate in the case. Had
he done so, he would probably have dissented as he did
in the Schillinger case, so that the decision may fairly be
regarded as carried by a majority of one only.
In the recent case of United States v. Lynah," involving
the flooding of land in the improvement of a river, Mr
Justice Brown (who had sided with the majority in both
the Schillinger and the Russell cases) said, in a concur-
ring opinion: "As we had occasion to remark in Dooley
v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, 224, the first section of
the Tucker act evidently contemplates four distinct
classes of cases: (I) those founded upon the constitution
or any law of Congress, with an exception of pension.
cases; (2) cases founded upon a regulation of an Executive
Department; (3) cases of contract, express or implied,
with the government; (4) action for damages, liquidated
or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort. The words
' not sounding in tort' are in terms referable only to the
fourth class of cases." He 'also stated that in the Schil-
linger case the question of a claim under the constitution
of the United States had only been considered in the
dissenting opinion, and he added:
"I think it is going too far to hold that the words of the
Tucker act, 'not sounding in tort,' must be referred back
to the first class of cases, namely, 'those founded upon the
constitution,' and that they should be limited to actions
for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, and, hence, the
consent of the owner cuts no figure in this case. I freely
admit that, if property were seized or taken by officers
of the government without authority of law, or subse-
quent ratification, by taking possession or occupying
property for public use, there could be no recovery, since
neither the government nor any other principal is bound
by the unauthorized acts of its agents. But in endeavor-
ing to raise an implied contract to pay for an ordinary
trespass to real estate, I think the opinion of the court
misconceives the true source of our jurisdiction."
17 288 U. S. 44S' (1903)-
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It will be recalled that in the Schillinger case the opin-
ion suggests the possibility that the limitation "in cases
not sounding in tort" may be understood as "qualifying
only the clause immediately preceding" (the clause as
to claims for damages, liquidated or unliquidated), "and
not extending to the entire grant of jurisdiction found
in the section." In view of that suggestion and of the
recent statements of Mr. Justice Brown, it would seem
probable that if a case arose in which the petition alleged
neither implied contract. nor infringement, but simply a
use or appropriation of the patented device, and a claim
for compensation under the constitution of the United
States for private property taken for public Use, the juris-
diction might be sustained in accordance with Mr. justice
Harlan's second ground of dissent in the Schillinger case.
As far as the cases actually decided go, however, it may
be said that the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction in
cases where the officers of the government use a particular
device, asserting a right to do so even as against one who
claims to be a patentee, except in cases where a contract
between the patentees and the government is still in force
in regard to the device in question, and also where the
government asserts a free license, express or implied,
from the patentee. The state courts have jurisdiction
in suits upon patents only where the recovery sought is
limited to an agreed compensation for the use of the
device, in the form of a royalty or license fee, and the
Court of Claims has held that its jurisdiction is that of
the state courts, amplified by jurisdiction in cases of
alleged implied contract also.'$
In view of the limited jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims, some patentees have undertaken to proceed
personally against the government officers who have
been concerned in using the alleged infringing devices;
but it has been held that an injunction will not lie to
restrain the construction or operation of public works;
that public officers, who make no profit from the use of
a patented -device on public works, cannot be required
Is Gill v. Unisted States, 2S C. Cls. R. 415 (89o).
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to account for profits, and further, that where no damages
,have been proved, except the gain to the United States
from the use of the device, no damages can be recovered
from the government's officer.0 This method of securing
compensation is therefore unfruitful
An implied contract is founded upon a presumed agree-
ment,20 but such a presumption must always be based
upon evidence showing that the parties, if reasonable
men, must have agreed. - Hence no contract can be im-
plied from the mere use of a patented device by gov-
•ernment officers through ignorance, carelessness, or mis-
take, or without proper authority. 2' So, too, where the
government uses a mechanical device of any kind as the
invention of a certain person, and undter a contract with
him, no contract can be implied with a third party who
asserts that the device used is really covered by his patent.
Such a claim, if valid at all, is for an infringement, and
is not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.=
The same doctrine of course applier where the govern-
ment declines the offer of a particular device, and subse-
quently its officers adapt other devices to attain the
desired results.2
Where an officer, with authority to control contracts
and prevent his subordinates from incurring liability,
declines to contract with a patentee, stating that his
practice is to buy from manufacturers only, with whom
the patentee can make his own arrangements, no con-
tract can be implied from a subsequent use of the pat-
ented device by subordinate officers.2' And where the
Belknap v. Schild, x6z U. S. io (z895). Harlan and Field. JJ..
dissented on the ground that there was an adequate remedy against
the government on an implied contract. James v. Campbell, 104
U. S. 356 (i88x). and Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., 123 U. S. 59 (2884),
also suits against public officers, had been decided adversely to the
patentees on the merits.
"Simpson v. United States, 31 C. Cls. R. 217, 245 (1896).
2 Forehand v. United States, 23 C. Cls. R. 477 (1888).
2 Fletcher v. United States, ix C. Cls. R. 748 (1875); Coston v. United
States, 33 id. 438 (x898); Henry v. United States, 38 id. - (z9o3).
' Wood v. United States, 36 C. Cls. R. 418 (19P).2 Sprague v. United States, 37 C. Cls. R. 448 (1902).
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government has a license to use a certain mechanism, a
part of which is patented, and subsequently a patent is
issued for another part, which the government claims
the right to use under the license, without additional
compensation, no contract for any further compensation
can be implied.2'
Where, on the other hand, the evideince -shows an offer
of an invention already patented, and an acceptance of
it as such, and a use under proper authority, the court
will take jurisdiction of the case as one where a contract
to pay a reasonable royalty must be implied. "When
a vendible article, such as ordinarily is the subject of
bargain and sale, is offered by a producer to a consumer,
though with no price specified, and is accepted and used
by the latter, it is not to be supposed on the one hand,
that the offer was intended as a gift inter vivos, nor
implied on the other hand that the taking was with a
tortious intent."28 The fact that the parties did not
agree upon a price is immaterial, it being presumed that
the government expected to pay, and the patentee to
receive, a reasonable price.n
Even in cases where a contract with the original pat-
-entee might be implied, an assignment of the patent
would not, apparently, transfer to the assignee any right
of suit against the United States. Sections 3477 and 3737
of the Revised Statutes show a clear intention to prevent
the transfer or assignment of any liability of the govern-
ment, however arising, until that liability is established
by judgment or otherwise, and a warrant has been issued
for its payment. An implied contract can in no sense
be transferred until it has been established by a judgment
or some departmental action, and a warrant has issued
for the payment of what is due upon it, and even then
only the claim for payment upon the implied contract
can be assigned, not the contract itself. For instance
"' Dashiell v. United States, 36 C. Cls. R. iz (z9oi).
26 l cKeeter v. United States, 14 C. Cls. R. 396 (x878).
3 United States v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262 (18R8); United States v.
Berdan Firearms Co., 156 U. S. 552 (1894).
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in Pasqueau v. United States,2 a judgment was recovered
upon an implied contract, and in a later suit by the same
claimant another judgment was recovered upon the same
implied contract. After judgment and the issuance of
a warrant, Pasqueau could have transferred his first
claim, but if he had assigned his patent his assignee could
not have brought suit for the second claim, as such suit
would have been based upon the assignment of an im-
plied contract with the government, in violation of -the
statute.
Turning from the question of jurisdiction to other
matters, several interesting points may be noted.
As the proceeding cannot be for an infringement-(ex-
cept by a special jurisdictional act), Section 4920 of the
Revised Statutes does not apply, so that the government
files no notice of special matter, and only discloses its
defense by the character of the testimony it takes.
In the case of an express contract which had been
assigned (prior to the enactment of R. S., section 3737,
forbidding the transfer of public contracts) the disloyalty
of the patentee was held not to affect the government's
liability to the assignee.? On the other hand, the gov-
ernment is entitled to all the benefits of an express con-
tract, and where the patentee is in the government's
employ his leaving that employ does not terminate the
contract, even though made for a nominal consideration."
A number of cases have arisen where inventions have
been made and patented by persons in the employ of the
government. In Talbert v. United States," the device
had been fully invented before the claimant entered the
government's service, but not patented until afterwards,
though the patent had been applied for before the govern-
ment ordered the device (a form of marine railway) to
be constructed. The chief of the Bureau of Yards and
Docks had promised compensation, but the Secretary of
the Navy had refused it, erroneously thinking that no
26 C. Cls. R. So9 (iggi).
" United States v. Burns, x2 Wall. 246 (x871).
McAleer v. United States, ISo U. S. 424 (1893).
" 25 C. Cls. R. 141 (x89o).
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compensation could be paid to an employe in such a case.
Suit was brought under a special act, but the chief of the
bureau's lack of auihority seems to be all that would have
prevented a recovery.upon the contract under the court's
regular jurisdiction.'
Where an inventdr, "beingin the government's service,
makes experiments at the government's expense, is con-
sulted about the adoption of the device, and recommends
it, saying that under the circunistances he will make no
charge, this constitutes an agreement for a free license,
valid even as against an assignee of the patent.3 More-
over, where nothing whatever is-said as to a future claim
for compensation, and the original drawings had been
made by the patentee in his own time, without cost to
the government, but the device was first embodied in the
form of an operative machine at the government's cost,
and the patentee bad seen it adopted and used for a con-
siderable time without making any claim, these circum-
stances have been held to imply a free license to the gov-
ernment.n It was contended, indeed, that the fact that
the invention existed on paper, in the drawings, before
the government undertook any expense in the matter,
was evidence that no contract could have been intended,
but Mr. Justice Brown said:
"An attempt is made to differentiate the case under
consideration from those cited 4 in the fact, stated in the
12 Solomons v. United States, 137 U. S. 342 (x89o). This was followed
in Davis v. United States, 23 C. Cls. R. 329 (x888), where the patentee
had been ordered to make the experiments, and get up the desired
device, as a part of his regular work, and the government paid the cost
of taking out the patent, nothing being said about compensation.
Gill v. United States, x6o U. S. 426 (1895). This case was fol-
lowed in Eagcr v. United States, 35 C. Cls. R. 55 (1goo). The judgment
in the Eager case was afterwards set aside and a new trial grai.ted, but
the court iltimately reached the same conclusion as before. In Har-
ley v. United States, decided Dec. 21, 19o 3 . it was held that long-con-
tinued failure to demand compensation sufficed to prevent a contract
from being implied, the patentee being in government employ, and
his superiors believing that on that account a free license was granted.
"These were McClurg v. Kingsland, x How. 202 (1843); Solomons
v..United States, 137 U. S. 342 (x8go); Lane & Bodlcy Co. v. Lock:, x o
id. 193 (1893); McAlecr v. United States, id. 424 (1893); Keyes v.
Eureka Mining Co., 158 id. 15o (1894).
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third finding, that the invention in this case, until it was
reduced to paper, in the form of an intelligible drawing,
was made out of the hours of labor at the arsenal, and
during the time which properly belonged to the patentee,
and that, by finding four, 'the claimant did not use any
property of the defendants or the services of any of the
employes of the defendants in making, or developing, or
perfecting the inventions themselves.' This, however,
must be taken in connection with the further finding that
'the cost of preparing patterns for the iron and steel cast-
ings, and of preparing working drawings, and of con-
structing machines was borne exclusively by the govern-
ment,' and that in each case, one or more machines or
articles of manufacture embodying the invention, had
been constructed and was in operation or use in the
arsenal with the claimant's knowledge and consent before
he filed an application for a patent. The inference to be
deduced from the findings is, in substance, that, while
the claimant used neither the property of the government,
nor the services of its employes in conceiving, developing
or perfecting the inventions themselves, the cost of pre-
paring the patterns and working drawings of the machines,
as well as the cost of constructing the machines them-
selves that were made in putting the inventions ,into
practical use, was borne by the government, the work
being also done under the immediate supervision of the
claimant.
"There is an assumption by the claimant in this con-
-nection that, if he did not make use of the time or prop-
erty of the government in conceiving and developing
his ideas, the fact is an important one as distinguishing
this case from those above cited. In view of the finding
* that he did not make use of the property and labor of the
government in preparing patterns and working drawings
and constrtcting his working machines, the distinction
is a very nafrow one-too narrow, we think, to create a
difference in principle, or to prevent the application of
the rule announced in those cases. . .
"In every case, the idea conceived is the invention.
Sometimes, as in the case of McClrg v. Kingsland, a
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series of experimehjt is necessary to develop and perfect
the invention. Atother times, as in. the case under con-
sideration, and appareritly in the Solomons case, the
invention may be reduced to paper in the form of an in-
telligible drawing, when nothing more is necessary than
the preparing of patterns and working drawings, and the
embodiment of the original idea in a machine constructed
accordingly. Now, whether the property of the govern-
ment and the services of its employes be used in the ex-
periments necessary to develop the invention, or in the
preparation of patterns and Working drawings, and the
construction of the completed machines, is of no im-
portance. We do not care, in this connection, to dwell
upon the niceties of the several definitions of the word
'develop' as applied to an invention. The material fact
is that, in both this and the Solomons case, the patentee
made use of the labor and property of the government in
putting his invention into the form of an operative ma-
chine, and whether such employment .was in the pre-
liminary stage of elaborating and experimenting upon
the original idea, putting that idea into definite shape by
patterns or working drawings, or finally embodying it in
a completed machine, is of no consequence. In neither
case did the patentee risk anything but the loss of his
personal exertions in conceiving the invention. In both
cases, there was a question whether machines made after
his idea would be successful or not, and if such machines
had proven to be impracticable the loss would have fallen
upon the government.
"In this connection, too, it should be borne in mind
that the fact, upon wiich so much stress has been laid
by both sides, that the patentee made use of the property
and labor of the government in putting his conceptions
into practical shape, is important only as furnishing an
item of evidence tending to show that the patentee con-
sented to and encouraged the government in making use
of his devices. The ultimate fact to be proved is the
estoppel, arising from the consent given by the patentee
to the use of his inventions by the government, without'
demand for compensation. The 'most conclusive evi-
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dence of such consent is an express agreement or license,
such as appeared in the McAleer case; but it may also be
shown by parol testimony, or by conduct on the part of
the patentee proving acquiescence on his part in the use
of his invention. The fact that he made use of the time
and tools of his employer, piut at his service for the pur-
pose, raises either an inference that the work was done
for the benefit of such employer, or an implication of bad
faith on the patentee's part in claiming the fruits of labor
which technically he had no right to enlist in his service.. i
"The acquiescence of the claimant in this case in the
use of his invention by the government is fully shown by
the fact that he was in its employ; that the adoption of
his inventions by the commanding officer was procured
at his suggestion; that the patterns and working drawings
were prepared at the cost of the government; that the
machines embodying his inventions were also built at the
expense of the government; that he never brought his
inventions before any agent of the government as the
subject of purchase and sale; that he raised no objection
to the use of his inventions by the government; and that
the commanding officer never undertook to incur a legal
or pecuniary obligation on the part of the government
for the use of the inventions or the right to manufacture
thereunder. It further appeared that from time to time
his wages were advanced from four to six dollars a day,
and while it was never stipulated by the commanding
officer, or understood by the claimant, that the advance
of wages was a consideration for the use of the inventions,
the practical ability of the claimant as an inventor, and
the value of his inventions to the government, did operate
on the minds of the officers in estimating the claimant's
services and ordering his advancement.
"Clearly, a patentee has no right, either in law or
morals, to persuade or encourage officers of the govern-
ment to adopt his inventions, and look on while they are
being made use of year after year without objection or
claim for compensation, and then to set up a large de-
mand, upon the ground that the government had im-
pliedly promised to pay for their use. A patentee is
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bound to deal fairly with the government, and if he -has
a claim against it, to make such claim known openly and
frankly, and not endeavor silently to raise up a demand
in his favor by entrapping its officers to make use of his
inventions. While no criticism is made of the claimant,'
who was a simple mechanic, and, as found by the Court
of Claims, 'a faithful, intelligent and capable employd,
whose services were of great value to the government,'
and whose conduct was 'fair, honest and irreproachable,'
and while the government appears to have profited largely
by his inventive skill, we are of opinion, for the reasons
-above stated, that the appeal in his behalf should be ad-
dressed to the generosity of the legislative, rather than
to the justice of the judicial department."
Where a government officer not merely uses the service
of other officers and the government's machinery to per-
fect his inventions, but also is influential in procuring
its adoption, he can recover no compensation for its use.
In such. a case, Nott, C. J., said:
"In this court public officers have always been regarded
as guardians of the public welfare, and the government
as a ward which is always under the protection of the
court. . . . The invention was brought to the atten-
tion of the ordnance officers by virtue of Colonel Kelton's
official position, and they consulted and deferred to him
in regard to the number which should be manufactured
at the outset. He could not, at one and the same time, be
the adjutant-general of the military department deter-
mining the number of the sight covers which should .be
issued for use, and the inventor claiming a royalty for the
device."u
When the United States is sued for.the use of a patent,
on a claim of implied contract, every defense is open to it
which is open to the defendant in an.ordinary infringe-
ment suit, because no contract to pay royalty on a device
covered by an invalid patent, or by any invalid claims of
a patent, can be implied. Such invalidity would be a
failure of consideration, fatal to the contract which the
Kelton v. United States, 32 C. Cls. R. 314 (1897).
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claimant seeks to establish.- Moreover, the fact that a
patent is issued in the name of the United States, and
that a fee has been required to be paid for such issue, does
not estop the government from defending on the ground
of the invalidity of the patent or claims relied on. When
the Secretary of the Interior issues a patent in the name
of the United States, his act is not of the same character
as when he contracts for work to be done or supplies to
be furnished. The United States, as represented by him,
does not act in the same capacity in the two cases. In
the latter it contracts for itself, in its individual capacity,
so to speak; but in the former it contracts in a fiduciary
or representative capacity, in behalf of the whole body
of people in the country. A patent for an invention con-
stitutes a contract, but it is a contract between the in-
ventor and the public, in which the government acts as
"the steward of public rights," the "representative of
the community."37
"It should always be remembered that in the grant of
a patent privilege, as now understood, a contract takes
place between the public and the patentee, to be sup-
ported upon the ground of mutual considerations, in all
its essential features, each having rights and interests
involved in its stipulations. .
"A patent should be construed as what it really is in
substance, namely, a contract or bargain between the
patentee and the public, upon those points which involve
the rights and interests of either party. '"'
"The concession of the patent privilege by the state
is an act having a threefold character. As a reward
bestowed upon the inventor for his past inventions; it is
an act of justice. As an inducement to future efforts, it
is an act of sound public policy. As a grant of temporary
protection in the exclusive use of a particular invention,
on condition of its immediate publication and eventual
surrender to the people, it is an act of compromise between
the inventor and the public, wherein each concedes some-
Gill v. United States. 2S C. Cls. R. 4XS (z89o).
Coryton on Patents, 20. " Curtis on Patents, xxiii, xxxv.
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thing to the other-in return for that which is conceded to
itself. In this latter character it is a true contract, to the
stipulations in which each party is bound with the same
strictness as in any other contract, and which is to be
interpreted in the same manner as other. legal obliga-
tions.11
It was this feature of patents for inventions which dis-
tinguished them from other monopolies, under which the
public received nothing, and caused patents to be ex-
pressly excepted from the operation of the statute 21
James I, ch. 3, abolishing monopolies.
In this contract between the inventor and the public,
a contract which the government makes as agent only,
not as principal, the consideration must be something
which moves from the inventor to the public, the prin-
cipal, and not to -its agent. The trifling office fees paid
by the patentee are merely charged to cover necessary
expenses, and cannot constitute the consideration for the
grant. What that consideration really is is indicated by
the words of the constitution, "To promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times
to authors and inventors the right to their respective
writings and discoveries." The consideration for a patent
is the promotion of the progress of science and useful arts,
the benefit to the community by the increase of its knowl-
edge and power, effected by the disclosure of the inven-
tion. An inventor who, by the description contained in
his patent, discloses to the community a useful art,machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, of
which it had no knowledge before, adds to the capabilities
of the community, and, in addition to whatever gain may
come to himself, contributes, in a very direct sense, to
its wealth. This contribution of his is the coisideration
for his patent, and to suppose .that the trifling office fees
constitute any part of the -consideration is to misunder-
stand the whole object of our patent system. Patents
are not granted in order to keep up a patent office, but
in order to secure to the public the disclosure of inven-
Robinson on Patents, *-4o.
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tions, in consideration of a limited right of monopoly to
the inventor.
As was said, some years ago, by an English writer:
"Letters patent for inventions are grants under the
great seal, whereby, in consideration of the improvement
effected by such inventions in trade, the exclusive enjoy-
ment of such improved trade for a limited period is assured
to the parties first communicating the inventions to.the
public."4
The same thought is seen in the statement of Robinson,
quoted above, where he refers to the "immediate publi-
cation" of the invention, and its "eventual surrender to
the people," as the condition upon which the inventor
receives a temporary right of exclusive use. "Condi-
tion," as there used, means consideration. The imme-
diate publication and eventual surrender are the con-
sideration for the grant to the inventor; and hence, just
as he who, under a contract, pays a money consideratioi,
is under an obligation to pay -in lawful .money, not in
spurious or counterfeit coin, so the inventor, in the pay-
ment of his consideration to the public, has an obligation,
which is two-fold: "(I)The result of .his inventive skill
must be of such a nature that a patent may lawfully be
granted to protect it; (2) the invention itself must be
fully communicated to the public."u
All this is so axiomatic, as well as so fundamental, that
the courts have scarcely ever been called upon to con>-
sider it, but it lies at the foundation of the right of a court
to inquire into the validity of a patent in any case. If
the so-called invention which the patentee publishes, and
which is eventually to be surrendered to the public, has
already been published, and is already surrendered, or
about to be surrendered, to the public, by some one else;
or if, though the first to publish, the alleged inventor is
not really the first inventor, and hence not entitled to
publish and eventually surrender the invention; then
there is clearly a failure of consideration, and the patent
must be declared void, either in whole or in part as the
a Robinson on Patents, 1 42.
4S5
40Coryton on Patents, z.
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case may be. Every judgment of a court, invalidating
a patent or any part of it, is simply a judgment that the
consideration for which the patent is granted has failed
in whole or in part.
When any one of the public, being sued on a patent,
defends on the ground of its invalidity, he merely asserts,
as (unless he has himself held and assigned the patent)
he has a perfect right to do, that in the contract between.
the inventor and the public there was no real considera-
tion, that the public, including himself, derived no benefit
from it. When the United States is sued on a patent, it
is not sued as the sovereign, or in its capacity as steward
of public rights, the capacity in which it has authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to issue patents in certain
cases, but merely as a part of that public with whom the
patentee has contracted; and in such a suit the United
States government has clearly the same right to set up
lack of invention or lack of novelty (i. e., failure of the
consideration for which the patent was granted) that any
other part of the public has. The grant of a patent has
never been held to involve any kind of guaranty of its
validity, and when the United States consents to be sued
as pxn individual user of a patent might be, it does not
assume the position of a guarantor of a patent any more
than in the case of a suit against an individual.
In Morse Arms Mfg. Co. v. United States,4 it was con-
tended, on a motion to strike out a special plea, that the
government could not attack the validity of a patent
which it had itself granted. The Court of Claims re-
viewed a number of cases in regard to the estoppel of per-
sons using patents under contract, and said:
"Applying these principles to this case, the contract
set forth in the complaint does not preclude the defend-
ants from setting up that Morse was not the first inventor
of the alleged improvements.
"If the special contract is relied on, the pleadings show
43 x6 C. Cls. R. 296 (x88o). In an earlier case, Hubbell v. United
States. 5 C. Cls. R. 1 (1869). one of the patents in suit had been held
to be invalid, but that suit was brought under a special act, recovery
being conditional upon validity.
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that the alleged prior contract, if it ever existed, had
neither term nor rate. Under such pleadings we cannot
shut out the defendants from proving that any use of the
alleged improvements which may be proved subsequent
to the special licenses was not made under a special con-
tract, or that Morse was not their real inventor.
"On the other hand, if the claimant relies on an implied
contract, it is an elementary principle, settled by long
practice, that a mere use of a patented improvement does
not imply a recognition of the validity of the patent. The
validity of the patent, its novelty, and the truth of its
invention by the patentee, are the first elements in testing
the value of its use.
"A plea that the alleged patent is no patent, that it is
void for want of novelty, that the alleged inventor of the
improvement was not the real inventor, does not take
away the jurisdiction when once acquired. Taken by
itself, it goes to the question of damages, showing either
an entire failure of consideration, or, as in McKeever's
case, a partial failure.
"It is therefore the duty of the court to retain such
cases, even if it involves determining the validity of a
patent."
When the case came before the court on the merits,
some years later, 3 the court so construed Morse's patent
as to distinguish his device from that of the government,
so that the validity of the patent was not passed upon,
but nothing was done inconsistent with the first decision.
In x885, in Hubbell v. United States," the point of non-
patentability was raised in the trial of the case, and was
one of the alternative grounds upon which the decision
rested. Davis, J., said:
"Under our construction of the patent in issue, the
government cartridges do not infringe the claimant's;
but if we are in error as to this, still the claimant cannot
recover, as the essential characteristics of his invention
now found in the government cartridge were developed
by officers of the army in i864-that is, if the relative
'3 Morse Arms Mfg. Co. v. United Stares, 27 C. Cls. R. 363 (x892).
"2o C. Cls. L 354 (z88S).
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position of the vents and the wall of the fulminate cham-
ber . is not material, still the claimant cannot
recover, as the other characteristics of his invention found
in the cartridge now used by the defendants were intro-
duced by them prior to the issue of the patent or the filing
of the application for it, and even prior to the application
of r865."
'The judgment was affirmeds for the first of the reasons
given by Judge Davis, and hence the Supreme Court did
not pass upon the second point; but there are other cases,
differing from these only in form, in which that court has
sustained the defendant's right to attack the validity of
the patent. A suit against an officer of the United States
on account of the use of a patented device in government
work under his charge, a matter in which he has no per-
sonal interest whatever, is really, in all but the name, a
suit against the government, practically just as much so
as a suit against a collector of customs or of internal reve-
nue for taxes erroneously collected, for it is inconceivable
that the government would not refund to its officer the
amount of any judgment so recovered for the use of a
patented device. Yet in _aines v. Campbell6 and Hollis-
ter v. Benedict Manufa:ering Co.47 the Supreme Court did
not hesitate to hold a patent, or certain of its claims, to be
invalid, where such a conclusion was warranted by the
evidence. In fact, in the former case the court doubted
very much whether the action could be sustained at all,
"because it is substantially a suit against the United
States," and should therefore have been brought in the
Court of Claims: and in the latter case the court said that
if an action could have been brought in the Court of
Claims, a question which it did not decide, "all questions
in relation to the validity of the patent" would have been
involved.
It is therefore perfectly clear from these authorities
that in any suit against the United States on a patent,
the defendant may attack the validity of the patent
43 Hubbell v. United States, i79 U. S. 77 (1900).
104 U. S. 356 (i88x). 113 U. S. 59 (1884).
USE OF PATENTED 1NVTkj§'*," :..................:.... :-:
as freely as might be done in a suit against an indi-
vidual or a corporation.
In the case of an express contract, the Court of Claims
has recently held that the United States is estopped from
setting up the invalidity of the patent, as a failure of con-
sideration, even though it was provided " that in case it
should at any time be judicially decided that the party of
the first part is not legally entitled, under the -letters
patent aforesaid, to own and control the: exclusive right
to the use and employment of said process and the decre-
mentally hardened armor plates produced thereunder, as
set forth in the letters patent aforesaid, then the payment
of royalty under the terms of this agreement shall cease,
and all sums of money due the party of the first part
. . . as royalty . . shall become the property
of the party of the second part."43 This decision was
strongly dissented from by one of the judges, and it is
understood that an appeal will be taken. It is hard to
see why the words "judicially decided" should not in-
clude a decision in a suit brought against the United.
States by the contractor, especially as the invention was
one that would only be used for battleships, so that -no
litigation would be likely to arise over the patent except
in connection with a use by the United States. It follows
from this decision that if the government had contracted
with another party for armor plates made by a process
which the Harvey Steel Company held to be really coy-
ered by its patent, the defense of invalidity of the patent
could only be set up in a suit against such third party for
the manufacture, not in a suit against the United States
for the use. The reason for such a distinction is hard to
understand.
Where the petition is dismissed because the device
actually used was not covered by the patent sued on, and
another suit is brought by the same party, based.upon a.
continuation of the same alleged use of the patented device,
the defence of res judicata will be upheld, even though not
specially pleaded, and even though due notice of an appeal
4 Harvey Steel Co. v. Unitcd States, 38 C. Cls. R. - (1903).
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from the first jucdgment has been given, but the appeal not
yet perfected.""0
In the case of a manufacture and use by the United
States, the cause of action is held to accrue, and the stat-
ute of limitations to run, when the invention is first em-
bodied in a manufactured article by the government's
officers. 0 Congress has, however, sometimes seen fit to
remove the bar of the statute by special act, and even, in
one instance, to grant to an applicant for a patent, a right
of suit as if a patent had been granted, provided that the
claimant should prove that the patent ought to have been
granted.
1
As the government does not manufacture articles for
sale, the mere right to manufacture would be valueless to
it, and hence the contract implied is a contract for the use
of a patented device, and the claimant must prove the
number of articles used, in order to recover damages."
Issuance for use is use," and the government cannot
defend on the ground that the use was experimental," or
that the device used was of no utility, except, presuma-
bly, as to the rate of royalty. The government must pay
for the use of an invention at the same rate at which such
inventions are usually paid for by ordinary manufac-
turers," but as the government does not make profits, in
the ordinary sense, out of the use of a patented device, the
damages, where there is no established rate of royalty,
must be estimated by the rule laid down in The Suffolk Co.
v. Hayden,"7 viz., on the basis of "the utility and advan-
tage of the invention over the old modes or devices that
had been used for working out similar results."" The
question is, what was the device worth in the market
Hubbell v. United States,.'z7 U. S. 203 (1898).
o "Butler v. United Statts, 23 C. ei.R. 335 (x888); Hartmany. United
States, 3S C. Cls. R. zo6 (.389).
' Act of March 2, 90!, Sr Stats.1788.
"Palmer v. United States, x9 C. Cls. R. 770 (1884)-
U Palmer v. United States, 20 C. Cis. R. 432 (1885). "1 Ibid.
'Palmer v. United States, i9 C. Cls. R. 770 (1884); 2oid. 432 (z885).
U Talbert v. United States. 25 C. Cls. R. 142 (1889).
3 Wall. 33S (x865).
U Dahlgren v.- United States, x6 C. Cls. R. 3o (z88o).
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when taken? And if no market price can be shown, the
court will adopt a price once agreed to by the parties, with
such modification as the circumstances may make reason-
able," or, if no price was ever agreed upon, then the court
will estimate the damages from such elements as the cost
of manufacture, the ordinary percentage of royalty for
similar articles, the judgment of persons familiar with
sales or licenses in the case of similar articles, licenses to
other parties by the patentee, etc.6 Nominal damages
cannot be recovered in the Court of Claims."
The rules of the Supreme Court relating to appeals from
the Court of Claims make no special provision for suits on
patents, and hence, in the matter of evidence, the parties
are limited, on appeal, to "a findling by the Court of
Claims of the facts in the case, established by the evi-
dence, in the nature of a special verdict, but not the evi-
dence establishing them," though all exhibits may, of
course, be sent up with the record. Under this rule even
the expert testimony which has been before the court
below cannot be considered by the Supreme Court, ex-
cept in so far as it may have been possible to incorporate
it in the findings, and the rule has been held to apply even
to an infringement suit, brought under a special act.a
The proceedings in the Patent Office, as shown by the file-
wrapper and contents, should, however, be embodied in
the findings if properly requested, being just as relevant
in a suit against the United States as in a proceeding
against any other party. An inspection of the record in
Hubbell v. United States" shows that a finding of the facts
shown by the file-wrapper and contents was refused by
the Court of Claims, on the ground that they were not
such facts as the court was required to find under the rule
above quoted, whereupon a finding was made setting
forth the statement which the court had been requested
o Pasqueau v. United States, 26 C. Cls. R. 509 (ig9).
.McKeever v. Unitcd States, 14 C. Cls. R. 396 (t878).
01 Grant v. United States, 7 Wall. 331 (z868).
'3 Hubbell v. United States, 6 C. Cls. R. S3 (1870).
a 179 U. S. 77 (1goo). an entirely different case from the one cited
in the preceding note.
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to find, and the refusal. The Supreme Court did not
refer to this peculiar state of the record, but decided the
point in the most unmistakable manner by devoting the
opinion almost wholly to a discussion of the proceedings
in the Patent Office, as shown by the file-wrapper and
contents...
It is perfettliy evident that neither the statutes which
govern the Couri of. Claims, nor the rules as to appeals
from that court, .have been drawn with any reference to
the peculiar nature of suits on patents. As the issues in
regaTd to the scope and validity of the patent are pre-
cisely the same where the government is charged .with
having used a patented device under an implied con-
tract, as in an ordinary infringement suit, there is no
reason-whatever for excluding any evidence from the
consideration of the appellate court in the former class
of cases, which would not be excluded in the latter class.
There can hardly be a doubt that the exclusion of all
expert testimony was due to a mere accident, the fact that
when the rules were drawn the jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims in patent cases was not taken into account. It
is to be hoped that the rule will some day be amended,
especially in view of the evident tendency to construe the
scope of that jurisdiction rather broadly, and of the prob-
able increase in the number of such patent suits. Cer-
tainly the parties to a suit in the Court of Claims are en-
titled to as full a consideration of every feature of their
case in the appellate court as are the parties to any other
judicial proceeding.
As to the statutes regulating the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims, if they cannot be legitimately construed
so as to give a patentee the same rights in the case of an
infringement by the government that he would have as
against a private infringer, then the spectacle is presented
of a constitutional right,, the existence of which the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly recognized, but which cannot
be asserted in any court, unless Congress can be persuaded
to grant jurisdiction in any particular case. Such a state
of affairs does not seem in accord with modern views as
to the rights of the citizen. Just why the courts should
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be open to a patentee as a matter of right when an indi-
vidual or corporation is the infringer, and not when the
United States does the same thing, is not easy to see, at
least from the patentee's point of view. The recognition
of an enforceable right in all such cases would remove all.
excuse for a resort to special legislation in favor of par-
ticular patentees, a practice which cannot be too severely
condemned. No citizen can have any right to a judicial
determination of his claim for the use of his patented
device, except just such -rights as are possessed by all
other citizens in similar cases.
Charles C. Binney.
